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This paper considers the imbricated domains of space exploration and Cold War 
geopolitics by following the trajectory of the ‘Corporal’, the world’s first guided 
missile authorized to carry a nuclear warhead. It examines the popular 
geopolitics of rocketry as both a technology of mass destruction and as a vehicle 
for the transcendent dreams of extra-terrestrial discovery. Avoiding both 
technical and statist accounts, the paper shows how these technologies of Cold 
War strategic advantage were activated and sustained through popular media 
and everyday experience. Particular attention is given to such mundane 
activities as children’s play, using the example of die-cast miniature toys of the 
Corporal. Through such apparently modest means, nuclear weapons were 
made intelligible in, and transposable to, a domestic context. The paper is also 
situated within a wider emerging literature on geographies and geopolitics of 
outer space. 
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Space and the atom are the two most exciting promises of modern science. Under the 
pressures of a world at war, the Atomic Age had an unfortunate start. As yet, fear casts a 
dark shadow that obscures the untold benefits that the atom has in store for us. Space 
flight, fortunately, will be different. It begins under the auspices of a noble international 
effort to be carried out in a spirit of peaceful cooperation among scientists of all civilized 
nations1. 






This is an essay about outer space. Although it primarily deals with the journey to 
the lower Earth orbit rather than further afield to inner planetary space or 
elsewhere in the solar system, it aims to contribute to an emerging interest in 
extra-terrestrial geographies by examining the place of rocketry within the 
cultural, political and geopolitical frames of the Cold War. As other scholars have 
pointed out, the technology of the rocket evokes that of the ship two centuries 
earlier2: as both vehicle and instrument, they opened up new  territories for 
science and commerce and inaugurated an entirely new frontier for exploration. 
The advent of rocketry not only unleashed a new geographical imagination in the 
mid-twentieth century but it also gave fresh momentum to earlier ideas about the 
discovery of new worlds. As Peter Redfield has elegantly put it: 
 
Although the airplane opened up the sky, and the radio tower filled the air with waves . . . 
neither made the limits of the Earth entirely visible or transparent. Space technology 
closed the sky again, bounded it from above and sealed it whole. Only then could the sky 
become fully modern in an active, technological sense, and only then could what lay 
beyond it become meaningful as space, a vast sea of darkness surrounding a blue and 
green point of human place. At last the world was one3. 
 
Until very recently, geographers in particular have been reluctant to move their 
‘graphy’ beyond the limits of the ‘geo’. A geography of outer space might sound 
like a quixotic enterprise though it is towards this over-ambitious end that the 
essay is directed. I want more specifically to consider the ‘popular geopolitics’ of 
space and this inevitably raises an obvious question about the applicability of a 
‘geo’-politics to the celestial realm. Everett Dolman has already projected 
classical geopolitics into space under the guise of ‘astropolitics’ but this is not the 
model I want to follow4. While there is much work to be done forging an 
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astropolitics which can critically examine the contested governance and 
sovereignty of space, this paper is only obliquely concerned with astropolitical 
dominance. Rather, I want instead to think through the parallel geopolitics of 
space exploration and Cold War weaponry through some resolutely grounded 
observations about the place of such technology in everyday civilian life here on 
Earth.  
 
In what follows, I step back from what is conventionally regarded as the inception 
of the Space Age: the dramatic launch of the Russian satellite Sputnik into a 
stable orbit on the 4th October 1957. There is no question that Sputnik is the pre-
eminent milestone in the history of the space race5. It is significant for all sorts of 
reasons, not least as the first in a technological lineage that would subsequently 
bequeath profound consequences for the nature of social life on Earth, from 
weather forecasting to telephony to surveillance to navigation to missile guidance 
and so on. Sputnik will doubtless remain an iconic marker of Cold War rivalry in 
the geopolitical contest for the heavens and the earth. But even before a payload 
could be placed in orbit, the rival superpowers faced the earlier and more 
fundamental challenge – which interests me here – of leaving Earth’s atmosphere 
in the first place.  
 
My concern here is with the evolving rocket programme of the American military 
from the end of the second world war to the early 1960s. While this study 
includes a number of different rockets, intended for a variety of strategic, military 
and research purposes, I concentrate in particular on the development of the 
‘Corporal’ (figure 1), an overlooked part of a wider programme which includes its 
technical variants (such as the WAC Corporal) and immediate precursors (such 
as the V-2, and the Bumper WAC). If I use the word ‘rocket’ in this context with 
some hesitation, it is because the word most frequently appended to the name 
Corporal is ‘missile’6. The distinction seems a fine one, but in a sense the entire 
history of space exploration lies in this slippage between rocket and missile; 
between a peace time research vehicle and a Cold War weapon of mass 
destruction. There is little, technically-speaking, to differentiate rocket from  
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FIGURE 1.  US Army training with the Corporal missile, 1954. Reproduced courtesy 
of Army Ballistic Missile Agency, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. 
 
missile. The terms are often used interchangeably, even if they each carry a quite 
different semiotic payload. Rocket is a fairly benign descriptor that simply refers 
to a vehicle which obtains thrust by the ejection of a fast moving propellant. This 
is the term most obviously associated with exploration. Missile, by contrast, 
implies impact and annihilation; an intent to destroy. While this different 
discursive construction of the technology is worth noting, the vehicle itself is 
exactly the same: space exploration and perpetual readiness for nuclear war are 
simply two parts of an identical story. The Corporal programme is therefore the 
classic embodiment of these seemingly irreconcilable objectives, for it has the 
acclaim of being the first man-made object to penetrate outer space as well as 
being America’s (and Britain’s) first nuclear missile. It was, as David de Vorkin 
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has described, the tool of science that would prepare the nation for the next war, 
with both ‘warhead’ and ‘peacehead’ applications7. 
 
The Corporal missile has curiously escaped any detailed consideration either by 
historians of the space age or those of nuclearism8. To be sure, it was not the first 
significant rocket (that notoriety must go to its direct predecessor, the German V-
2), nor was it the first nuclear weapon (the free-fall bomb ‘Little Boy’ whose 
accomplishment was the mass killing of 140,000 civilians in Hiroshima). The 
Corporal, being a ‘tactical missile’ with a modest range of 75 nautical miles, was 
also of limited strategic significance compared to subsequent Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), like the more versatile ‘Atlas’, which could usefully 
dispatch death to remote peoples as well as place satellites into orbit. While the 
Corporal was briefly on the front line of nuclear defence, it was never used in 
conflict. This is perhaps just as well; in the early years, the Corporal had such a 
terrible record of target accuracy that its most likely casualties would have been 
its own troop battalions. It was, if anything, a bit of a dud. It was also however the 
first man-made object to leave the Earth’s atmosphere9. And as the first guided 
missile authorized to carry a nuclear warhead, it arguably has particular 
significance as the progenitor of contemporary weapons of mass destruction. 
Moreover, at the time of its development it carried, however fleetingly, a raft of 
hopes and fears both about the space age and about nuclear war.  
 
What interests me here is what we might call the ‘cultural success’ of the 
Corporal, an object that sat astride the categories of ‘rocket’ and ‘missile’, drawing 
on the popular enthusiasm for space to legitimate its underlying military 
purpose. In this essay then, I want to discuss the place of the Corporal within the 
popular and political cultures of the era. And in so doing I pay most attention to 
the ways in which the missile was figured across a diverse suite of cultural forms. 
I situate my argument within a wider literature on ‘popular geopolitics’, a recent 
emphasis within critical geopolitics that attends to the circulation of geopolitical 
power through popular culture rather than through familiar networks of 
statesmen, generals and ruling elites. To talk, therefore, of the ‘popular 
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geopolitics’ of rocketry is to examine how the technologies of Cold War strategic 
advantage were activated and sustained through popular media and everyday 
experience. The essay argues that the power of the Corporal lay less in its 
technical ability to propel a 20 kilton nuclear fission warhead 40 km high than in 
its presence as a flexible narrative prop, able to support popular enthusiasms 
about space while coyly doubling as a weapon of mass destruction. That the 
Corporal was ‘domesticated’ as a die cast children’s toy is, I argue, indicative of 
how the widespread enthusiasm for rocketry and space exploration in the 1950s 
eased nuclear weapons into the political mainstream.  
 
In the first instance, I try to open up space and its exploration as a research 
theme which could usefully be considered within the orbit of geography. Drawing 
on earlier precedents for thinking of space as a sphere of the social, I emphasise 
the strategic, scientific and geopolitical continuities between space exploration 
and earlier episodes of imperial endeavour.  The history of the Corporal 
programme is then understood in this light, as a technology variously configured 
as vehicle, instrument and projectile, that emerged from the ruins of the second 
world war to become a key weapon in NATO’s Cold War arsenal. Lastly, I want to 
think more closely about the popular geopolitics of the Corporal programme, 
examining the by no means untroubled passage of the missile through domestic 
as well state contexts. 
 
 
TOWARDS A GEOGRAPHY OF  
THE OUTER EARTH 
 
 
An historical geography of space exploration has yet to be written. And such a 
task might only be one part of a broader geographical engagement with outer 
space which has, to date, been strangely limited.  Strange, because it is now over 
fifty years since humans first cast their instruments into orbit. Our species has 
lived in space for more or less the last twenty years, and is currently represented 
by the crew of the International Space Station. The journey through the Earth’s 
atmosphere, once a major obstacle, is now made on an almost weekly basis. 
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There are over 700 operational spacecraft in orbit and over 35 nations now have 
payloads in space. In short, the last fifty years has seen the outer-Earth become 
an ordinary and accessible sphere of human endeavour, with our presence in 
(and reliance on) space making it one of the enabling conditions for our current 
mode of everyday life. It would be easy to draw a rather superficial connection 
here, trading on the commodious meaning of the word ‘space’ as both the 
primary analytic for contemporary human geography and as the popular term for 
the expanse in which solar and stellar systems are located. But I want, in passing, 
to make the more ambitious argument that geography is the obvious disciplinary 
home for the study of the cultural, political, economic and strategic contest over 
the outer-Earth. Such a project is not a search for the new, but rather a boldly 
going back to some of geography’s earlier origins. For if outer space is a scale that 
for the most part feels unfamiliar to human geographers, such limited 
disciplinary horizons are, paradoxically, a late modern tendency. David 
Livingstone has shown how, in figures like the sixteenth century scholar-
mathematician John Dee (1527-1608), astronomical enquiry and the study of 
cosmography aimed to connect the workings of heaven and earth10. It was the 
planetary scale which formed the background to much geographical teaching in 
the early modern period, the movements of the stars being afforded significance 
in the outcome of worldly affairs. As I have explored elsewhere, there are a 
number of geographical precedents for thinking about outer space11.  
 
A related argument worth mentioning is that a geography of outer space is a 
logical extension of earlier geographies of imperial exploration12. Space 
exploration has used exactly the same discourses, the same rationales, and even 
the same institutional frameworks (such as the International Geophysical Year, 
1957-1958) as terrestrial exploration. And like its terrestrial counterpart, the 
move into space has its origins in older imperial enterprises13. Marina Benjamin 
argues that for the United States outer space was ‘always a metaphorical 
extension of the American West’14. When Frederick Jackson Turner argued in 
1893 that the frontier was central to American identity and nationhood, his thesis 
could equally be applied to the US space programme’s encounter with the ‘final 
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frontier’ in the twentieth century15. Peter Redfield makes a similar point in 
relation to the French Arianne space programme which relied on its earlier 
colonial ties to take advantage of the fuel economies associated with an equatorial 
launch, rather than sites at lower latitudes. Looking at the imbricated narratives 
of colonialism and rocketry in French Guiana, he makes the case that ‘outer space 
reflects a practical shadow of empire’16.  
 
The history of the Corporal missile also stands in this shadow. Not only was the 
Corporal (as rocket) part of a bid to open up the new empire of space on the part 
of the United States, but the Corporal (as missile) was also a means of shoring up 
imperial power back on Earth. When the British government bought the 
programme from the United States in 1954 it was purchased as means of re-
asserting Britain’s geopolitical significance in the context of its own imperial 
anxieties17. Even before the ignominies of Suez, Britain had ‘lost’ India and 
Pakistan to independence movements; surrendered the Palestine mandate to the 
United Nations; and passed responsibility over Greece and Turkey to the United 
States. Possessing a nuclear missile was then seen by Winston Churchill as a 
shortcut back to the international stage at a time when Britain’s own home-grown 
missile programme was in its infancy18. It is clear then that the imperative of 
space exploration went hand in hand with terrestrial geostrategic considerations, 
both of which were extensions of earlier regimes of imperial power. Even if the 
political geography literature has scarcely engaged with outer space, we can 
conceive the advent of rocketry as one expression of Cold War (imperial) 
geopolitics. All of this is to say, then, that a geography of space and its 
exploration, both in terms of its historical development and its contemporary 
astropolitics, is not some farfetched or indulgent distraction from the ‘real world’; 
rather, it is constitutive of numerous familiar operations, from international 
relations and the conduct of war, to the basic infrastructural maintenance of the 
state and to the lives of its citizenry19.  Space, and how we got there, matters. And 
this is true not least because thinking about space and its exploration presents a 
series of challenges to the terrestrial character of geography itself, as well 
perhaps, as testing some of the basic tenets of social theory20. Moreover, the 
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ability to leave the atmosphere has profoundly refocused attention on the 
geographical knowledge of Earth itself; in all sorts of ways, then, attaining orbit 
has helped remake Earthly geographies. I consider the Corporal programme to be 
a useful starting point for considering many of these themes. And yet what is 
ultimately most interesting for our purposes here is to think about how this early 
unmanned space exploration engaged the popular imagination in ways that 
legitimated and sustained particular geopolitical logics here on Earth. 
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‘BULLETS WITH BRAINS’: THE CORPORAL AS PEACETIME 




The story of CORPORAL’s birth, growth and development into a full-fledged guided 
missile system is one of trial and error, a pattern of devoted human endeavour studded 
with many failures and fewer heartening successes, acknowledging each failure and 
profiting from it, and striving towards the goal of providing the Army Field Forces with an 
efficient deterrent to aggression. The story is one of improvisations, of making do with 
what was available in materials and components, of feeling the way as explorers into the 
unknown, uncharted realm of rocketry21. 
 
 
In recounting the history of the Corporal, one must first deal with its name. Why 
‘Corporal’?  It was a question of rank. In 1944, the US Army had commissioned a 
new missile programme from a rocketry team at what became the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL) at the California Institute of Technology22. Their first attempt 
was a primitive test vehicle called ‘Private’, a simple unguided ballistic missile 
which was launched in December 1944. As JPL engineer William H. Pickering 
recalled in an interview, ‘when we started out, we said first of all we’d do Private, 
then we’d do the Corporal, and then we’d do Sergeant, and maybe get up to the 
General’.  Laughing at this point, he added: ‘we had the WAC Corporal too – 
Woman’s Army Corps … it was a little one [more laughter]’23. This was a regular 
little gag among rocket scientists. More accurately, WAC stood for ‘Without 
Altitude Control’, a reference to the fact that this simple prototype of a research-
based sounding rocket had no stabilisation and guidance system. But ‘Women’s 
Army Corps’ fitted rather well with the unmistakably gendered assumptions 
about the (low ranking) place of women in the military and, indeed, about the 
perceived ‘modesty’ of this particular rocket. In due course, it was succeeded by 
the apparently more mature ‘Corporal’ proper and eventually by the ‘Sergeant’, 
both of which were authorised to carry nuclear warheads. But for all these 
deprecating remarks, the WAC Corporal was a crucial interim stage in the history 
of rocketry, for many years holding the record, when combined with the V-2, for 
the highest altitude ever attained by human technology. 
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The origins of the American Corporal programme lie in Europe.  It was German 
rocket scientists led by the inimitable Werner von Braun, who developed Nazi’s 
Germany’s V-2 (‘Vergeltungswaffe 2’ or ‘Reprisal Weapon 2’, as Goebbel’s called 
it). As the world’s first ballistic missile, it rained terror on London in the last 
desperate phase of the Second World War. Although 2700 civilians were killed 
and thousands more were injured, it was the morale-sapping psychological 
effects of the missile that stand out. Unlike other weapons, its arrival went 
unheralded by engine noise or sirens. It accomplished terror by travelling in 
complete silence and at supersonic speed. There was no warning, just instant 
destruction. Nor was there any defence against V-2 attack. Unsurprisingly, when 
the end of the war came, rival military commanders were desperate to get hold of 
the weapon leading to a scramble among the Allies for access to V-2 equipment 
and personnel. Only then did the full scale of the V-2 production, and its reliance 
upon slavery become clear: a concentration camp at Mittelbau-Dora had been 
established – effectively an extension of the infamous Buchenwald –  in order to 
provide labour for the construction of the V-2. In the eighteen months of 
production, an estimated 20,000 people died: mass destruction was therefore the 
ancillary outcome of rocketry even from its inception, quite aside from its 
intended military consequence. The American success in acquiring the V-2 was 
principally achieved through the auspices of Operation Overcast24, an audacious 
programme which, under the leadership of Col. Holger N. Toftoy, brought over 
nearly 500 German scientists and engineers over to the US, many of whom were 
put to work at the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexcio (figure 1). 
Foremost among these was von Braun who eventually recruited his old mentor 
on the V-2, Hermann Oberth, whose book By Rocket to Planetary Space, 
published in 1923, is regarded as one of the founding documents of the Space 
Age.   
 
The V-2 was a gift to the nascent American space programme. Although not an 
especially versatile weapon of war, the enormous German investment necessary 
to develop the science of viable propulsion suddenly became available for a new 




FIGURE 2. Officials of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency with model US rockets, 
Alabama, 1956.  Pictured from left to right, Ernst Stuhlinger, Major General Holger 
Toftoy, Hermann Oberth, Wernher von Braun, and Robert Lusser. The Corporal 
missile is the second model from the right; the V-2 is closest to the camera. Image 
reproduced courtesy of NASA.  
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grown WAC Corporal was quickly overtaken by the success of the V-2 for high 
altitude flights. With over one hundred V-2s available for research purposes25, it 
soon established itself as indispensable for the study of near-Earth space 
phenomena. In one sense, it was the perfect research vehicle as the weight lost by 
the removal of the German warhead could be usefully replaced with scientific 
instrumentation, or, as happened in 1946, with camera equipment. And on the 
24th October 1946, launch number 13 produced the first pictures of the Earth 
from space. Writing in the National Geographic, the camera’s engineer, Clyde 
Holliday, claimed that these were the first pictures to show the curvature of the 
Earth ‘from the border of outer space’, with ‘single views cover[ing] 100,000 
square miles’26. Holliday’s ability to foresee the profound implications of this 
episode is truly remarkable: 
 
Results are now pointing to a time when cameras may be mounted on guided missiles for 
scouting enemy territory in war, mapping inaccessible regions of the earth in peacetime, 
and even photographing cloud formations, storm fronts, and overcast areas over an entire 
continent in a few hours, which would be of great benefit to weather forecasters27. 
 
 
It could, he thought, even ‘detect troop movements’: ‘camouflage would hide little 
from such an all seeing eye’28. Reaching the heights of the upper atmosphere  
with his camera allowed Holliday to anticipate the new horizons that would 
ultimately be opened up by satellite technology. Central to America’s later 
satellite programme was Colonel Holger Toftoy (Figure 1), the Overcast leader, 
who also oversaw the combination of the V-2 with the WAC Corporal to produce 
the world’s first two-stage liquid propellant rocket. The power of the V-2 would 
give a ‘bump’ to the WAC Corporal which could then start its journey from an 
already high-altitude platform, hence the name the ‘Bumper WAC’. It was this 
vehicle – an important prototype for the Corporal proper – that became, after 
several attempts in 1948 and 1949, the first man-made object to penetrate space 




FIGURE 3. The Bumper WAC becomes the first man-made object to penetrate outer 
space, launched from the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico on the 24th 
February 1949. Image reproduced courtesy of NASA. 
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miles per hour and an altitude of about 244 miles, a record it kept until it was 
broken by an Aerobee in 1957. The footage from these V-2 and Bumper WAC 
flights inevitably generated considerable excitement. To see the Earth receding at 
high speed gave an altogether more tangible sense of the possibility of space 
travel. In 1956, Michael Todd’s film version of Jules Verne’s Around the World in 
Eighty Days opened with a Corporal being launched at the White Sands Missile 
range, followed by footage from the rocket. It was the first taste of rocketry’s 
accelerated sublime.  
 
Rocketry, however, was not primarily about space exploration. The refinement of 
guidance systems – initially through the Corporal ‘E’ test vehicle – had very 
obvious applications for warfare. John E. Dahlquist, Commanding General of the 
US Army in the 1950s, argued that ‘guided missiles, especially when atomic 
armed, represent the most radical change in weapons systems since the invention 
of gunpowder’29. They were, he said, ‘bullets with brains’.  The Corporal was the 
first vehicle to warrant this description, being the first tactical surface-to-surface 
missile authorized to carry an atomic warhead. The Corporal in effect became the 
earliest nuclear missile, shifting from an experimental vehicle to a practical field 
weapon. The context for this transition was a wider set of geopolitical maneuvers 
that had seen America’s troop commitment scaled down from their expensive 
wartime heights while at the same time anticipating a new era of Cold War 
conflicts. President Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ policy had replaced conventional 
defence doctrine with an approach that simultaneously promised ‘massive 
nuclear retaliation’ while making peace with the Soviet Union and protecting 
America’s economy. But for the US, like the UK, a compromise had to be found 
between a policy of massive nuclear retaliation and the doctrine of a ‘flexible 
response’, which might include the deployment of conventional forces as well as 
small-scale ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons. The changing security environment in 
Eastern Europe meant that the American policy, and that of NATO more broadly, 
was geared to the possibility of fighting a ‘limited’ nuclear war using lower yield 
tactical weapons such as the Corporal. To the extent that the Corporal had 
escaped widespread public acclaim in relation to the Bumper WAC high altitude 
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flights, it had, by the late 1950s, acquired an entirely new public profile as the 
front line of missile defence. It was the figuratively male soldier, standing 
sentinel over the feminised nation-state.  
 
Although reconfigured as a field weapon, the Corporal always retained the 
cumbersome handling of a research vehicle, rather than the versatility required 
by the Army at war. A single test firing required a battalion of 250 men equipped 
with 35 vehicles working 7-9 hours to complete preparation for launch in a 
process that involved handling liquid fuel and an extremely hazardous oxidant, 
red fuming nitrous oxide (RFNA). Until 1955, its in-flight reliability and accuracy 
was less than 50 per cent, with only modest improvements in this record 
thereafter30. So the power of the missile – which was never fired in combat – lay 
less in its potential for destruction (though this was still considerable –
significantly more powerful than what was dropped on Hiroshima) but rather in 
its status as a monument: as a symbol of power to be seen alike by American 
citizen and rival sovereign states. The Corporal had a monumental presence in a 
whole range of public contexts, from a life-size model for use as an Army 
recruiting prop31 to being pictured, as we shall see, in collectors cards in 
breakfast cereals. Bryan Taylor has argued that the paradoxical conditions of 
Cold War deterrence ‘effectively fused nuclear arms and monuments’32. By this 
he means that because both superpowers built up sufficient arsenals to ensure 
mutual destruction, nuclear weapons ‘could only be used as symbols of national 
capability and intention’. In Jacques Derrida’s famous formulation, missiles thus 
became ‘fabulously textual’: that is to say that the referent of nuclear narratives 
could only be realized with the erasure of narration itself33. And it is in this 






THE POPULAR GEOPOLITICS OF ROCKETRY 
 
Geopolitics is not what it used to be. The critical geopolitics agenda, so 
formatively inaugurated by Gearóid Ó Tuathail in the 1990s, has since broadened 
the terms of its inquiry, responding to criticism that it had reproduced the narrow 
focus of classical geopolitics on the state and its governing and intellectual and 
political elites of ministers, generals and tacticians34. New work on popular 
geopolitics has sought to redress this balance by looking at how geopolitical 
power is circulated in and through popular culture, ‘ordinary experience’ and 
everyday life. In particular, a few researchers are taking up Nigel Thrift’s 
injunction to attend to how ‘the little things’ – like the object world, the human 
body and even words as ordinary as the definite article – matter in the operation 
of statecraft35. This sort of approach is particularly instructive for thinking about 
Cold War militarism and space exploration, for in both cases these were 
sustained by popular movements and expressed through such mundane activities 
like child’s play. Moreover, it is also a useful corrective not only to the state-
dominated field of geopolitics but also to the no less state-dominated histories of 
nuclearism36. Much attention has already been directed at the impact of 
nuclearism on popular literary cultures37. John Canaday, for instance, has 
persuasively argued that ‘nuclear weapons have exercised their power in the 
purely literary form of their fictional use in the future’38. But it is worth 
reiterating an important distinction here, that this is not merely a matter of 
representing the geopolitical power of nuclear weapons through fiction, but that 
this is the power of nuclear weapons: we are dealing with the effect (rather than 
the referent) of representation39. A similar point might be made in relation to 
space exploration which has its earliest origins in literary flights of fancy. Popular 
culture cannot be understood as ‘responding’ to space exploration as much as 
being constitutive of it. 
 
All of this supports my argument that popular geopolitics is a suitable perspective 
from which to think about Cold War rocketry. At the same time, however, I want 
to avoid some of the more obvious cultural arenas in which rocketry was 
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popularly figured such as television, film and literature. The Corporal has 
featured as a narrative prop in all manner of screen and literary contexts, perhaps 
most famously in Ian Fleming’s Goldfinger, in which the villain’s plan to 
contaminate the gold reserves of Fort Knox with a stolen Corporal warhead is 
foiled by the deft (though decidedly straight) maneuvers of 007 and Pussy 
Galore40. But I am a little wary that much of the popular geopolitical literature 
has settled on film41 which, while resolutely popular, is hardly in the spirit of the 
‘little thing’ (quite aside, of course, from the embeddedness of Hollywood within 
wider state-corporate networks).  Instead, I want to concentrate on the most 
ephemeral cultural presences of the Corporal, in order to think about how the 
geopolitics of militarism and space exploration were enacted in everyday 
contexts. And in a further departure from the mainstream of popular geopolitics I 
want to foreground, as far as I am able, the role of mundane social practices 
working in and through artefacts and representations. I am interested in the 
geopolitics of two practices in particular, play and collecting, which are in turn 
examined through the representational forms of toys and cards. 
 
Rocketry as child’s play 
 
 
It has never been clear to me why the perennially stupid question what do you 
want to be when you grow up? often anticipates an answer like ‘astronaut’.  
Arguably, the astronaut is the postwar version of the polar explorer, embodying 
certain qualities and virtues that adults would like to instill in their children. And 
yet for children too, space and its exploration have been fertile imaginative 
resources, even before the advent of rocketry.  This last point is important. Play is 
the precursor to space exploration: it would be impossible to separate the serious 
business of rocketry from various forms of tinkering and toying with the 
(im)practicalities of propulsion. Hermann Oberth, one of the founders of rocket 
science, pictured in figure 1, was known to have developed his expertise out of 
childhood play having been fascinated with Jules Verne from the age of eleven. 
The same also applies to war games; playing at or with war is a constituent part of 
warfare itself42.  So it should not be surprising that a technology like rocketry – 
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doubling as vehicle of space exploration and weapon of mass destruction – would 
be such a prominent narrative prop in children’s play in the 1950s. While there 
were doubtless many instances of rocketry featuring in play without any bespoke 
toy to facilitate the imagination, I want to think here about some specific forms of 
toy missile and the games they might have evoked. It is striking that there were 
very deliberate attempts to reproduce missile technology for the playroom and 
thus to translate the hardware of nuclear destruction and its wider geopolitical 
narrative into a domestic setting. My approach, then, is to take seriously the ludic 
activities of children as a suitable subject for geopolitical enquiry. While this 
project follows some recent attempts to re-think the status of children in political 
geography43, it is is less aligned with the ‘children’s geographies’ literature44 than 
with a distinct concern with play and its cultural significance45.  
 
In a recent paper, Nigel Thrift has examined the rise of the ‘supertoy’, a term 
borrowed from a short story by Brian Aldiss, by which he refers to a new 
generation of plaything, such as the Tamagotchi, that, as an assemblage of 
hardware and software, can ‘intelligently’ interact with its environment and 
users46. Thrift is interested in the toy as a form whose character is changing in 
ways that might reconfigure the sociality of its users. When talking about 
‘supertoys’, it seems unlikely however that Thrift could have been aware of 
Dinky’s series of 1950s die-cast models with exactly the same name. But his claim 
that ‘the course of interactivity has nearly always been prefigured by the history 
of toys’, seems to me an important one which would bear consideration in 
relation to the Dinky Supertoy47. The idea of ‘interactivity’ in my example is 
rather different from Thrift’s, but there are some interesting points of connection 
nonetheless.  
 
The Dinky Supertoy no. 666 – a Missile erector vehicle with Corporal missile and 
launching platform – was first advertised on the back page of Meccano Magazine 
in November 1959 (figure 4). Inside the magazine, in an article called ‘Dinky Toy 
News’ by ‘The Toyman’, the reader is told that ‘this fine new item is going to be 
one of the most sought for [sic] and popular of all the many fine Dinky Supertoys 
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already available’48. It was, explained The Toyman, ‘an accurately modeled 
miniature of Britain’s famous guided weapon’ and ‘a working model that has lots 
of play value, for the rocket itself can be loaded on to its launching platform and 
fired in a realistic manner’. ‘Britain’s famous guided weapon’ was a truth of sorts. 
Britain had bought the Corporal programme from the US in 1954, and after 
building a firing range on the islands of South Uist and Benbecula in Scotland’s 
Outer Hebrides, it had tested the first of their 113 missiles in June 195949. The 
launch of the toy missile therefore coincided, as the advert itself implies, with the 
public interest in the Hebridean debut of the Corporal. At least the Dinky model 
was ‘Made in England’ even if the original was, by urgent strategic necessity, a 
foreign import. The advert goes on to emphasise agency and control: this is ‘the 
Corporal missile … a rocket you can launch’; ‘a realistic model that actually 
WORKS; ‘it’s new, it fires’. The toy could be finely manipulated by its child 
operative, even to the extent of gearing that enabled ‘the boom to pick up the 
missile and swing it to the horizontal traveling position’. In this way, the work of 
250 men, 35 vehicles and 9 hours could be accomplished by a child in a few 
minutes. It is the event of launch in miniature form.  
 
The launch event is integral to the toy; it is part, but by no means all, of its 
purpose. It achieves a particular experience of time and space, a series of 
anticipatory preparations followed by a countdown and the moment of launch in 
which the exact timing and target are established by the player through the 
symbolic manipulation of the object. The launch works as play in part because it 
successfully addresses what child psychiatrists John and Elizabeth Newson have 
called its ‘happening-hunger’50. As Dan Fleming notes  
 
children need things to happen and are impatient with the adult temper which, from time 
to time, simply wants things to stop happening. Many things can count as happenings, 
and in fact playing becomes a way of generating happenings when none are forthcoming 
from other sources51.  
 
Children thus become geopolitical agents through their mastery of the missile 
event. And, characteristically, it must be repeated over and over again. Walter  
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FIGURE 4. Advert for Dinky Supertoy no. 666, Missile erector vehicle with Corporal 
missile and launching platform, as it appeared in Meccano Magazine, November 
1959.   
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Benjamin recognised that ‘repetition is the soul of play, that nothing gives … [the 
child] greater pleasure than to ‘Do it again!’”52. For Benjamin, it is a way of 
overcoming frightening fundamental experiences – a taming of the Real. But 
what exactly is being repeated? Is this a rocket or a missile, a weapon or a 
vehicle? Is this about war or peace, space exploration or the Cold War defence of 
capitalism? Or something else altogether? It is all of these things, of course; the 
toy is propelled by the ambiguity. Toy theorists like Brian Sutton-Smith have 
constantly emphasized that toys do not come with overdetermined meanings: 
they do not dictate play but rather ‘the plans of the playful imagination dominate 
… the toys, not the other way round’53. However, as Dan Fleming argues, this 
endless liminality of the toy is perhaps ‘more in the eye of the critic-analyst than 
in the reality and materiality of a culture which appears rather more ruthless than 
this at deciding how things are’54. When first introduced, both the Dinky missile 
and its Corgi rival were relatively open to being either weapon or space vehicle. 
The Corgi model in particular was marketed as part of its ‘Rocket Age’ series. But 
by 1961, it had tilted the meaning of the Corporal by introducing a ‘percussion 
warhead’ (model no. 1480) to be bought separately and ‘easily and quickly fitted 
to your missile … loaded with standard caps to give a really authentic explosion 
on impact’. The centrality of the launch had thus shifted to that of impact. 
 
In Dinky’s advert, details of the toy (with ‘a harmless soft hollow rubber nose 
cone to ensure safety’) are placed alongside details of the ‘real’ missile, though the 
advert is shy of noting its nuclear capability. In other respects, absolute fidelity to 
the original is important. It is, of course, a scale model and the detail included in 
the miniature was considered to be essential. It was, after all, a competitive 
marketplace. The early Dinky versions of the 666 vehicle had neither windows 
nor driver, but both had to be introduced to respond to the rival Corgi’s toy, 
advertised with the slogan ‘Corgi – the one with windows’55. This sluggish 
attention to detail across Dinky’s range was fatal for its market share and by the 
time the Corporal was withdrawn, it was in serious financial difficulties.  But 
what does this level of detail mean? Fleming refers to the toy’s degree of 
representational accuracy and realism as its ‘modality’ which runs alongside 
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(sometimes in competition with) its mechanical activity56.  The basic ‘toyness’ of 
the Corporal is achieved through miniaturization, which in turn allows the 
operative a sense of control and superiority. But detail must still be preserved; it 
must be ‘real enough’, not least because the toymaker must satisfy some degree of 
technical knowledge on the part of the player. Toys like this both assume and 
impart serious technical competence, not only in terms of fine motor skills but 
also as an analogue of ‘real’ military field knowledge. Indeed, the full slippage 
between the worlds of play and of war are nowhere more apparent than 
elsewhere in the same issue of Meccano Magazine where other adverts by the 
Army and the Royal Navy encourage boys of 14 to leave school and join up as a 
trade apprentice. The child-consumer that one day purchases a toy might the 
next day decide to enlist. There is no doubt other than that these toys assume the 
meta-context of the Cold War. In Thrift’s description of the highly ‘mediatized’ 
contemporary supertoy, he notes that ‘from My Little Pony to Barbie, the worlds 
on offer are a series of micro-ontologies which children can link into’57. But in the 
case of the 1950s Supertoy, the context was quite different: while the child might 
use the missile as part of a wider set of military toys, it was still within the 
narrative parameters of Cold War conflict. All of this might seem to be a long way 
from space exploration but what I am arguing here is that this ‘doubling’ of the 
Corporal in ‘real life’, as weapon and as exploration vehicle, is opened up through 
play; and moreover, such a mundane practice actually helps sustain these dual 
geopolitical logics of rocketry in the first place.  
 
Stockpiling and Assembling 
 
I mentioned that the Corporal could be one part of a wider military toyset. Corgi 
toys marketed its ‘Rocket Age Sensations’ en masse, encouraging the consumer to 
build up a complete set of the equipment necessary for launching a missile. This 
included everything from the Erector Vehicle (no. 1113), the International Army 
Truck (no. 1118), the R.A.F. Vanguard Staff Car (no. 352), the Decca Airfield 
Radar 424 Scanner (no. 353), the Decca Airfield Radar Van (no. 1106) and the 
R.A.F. Land Rover (no. 351). The missile was thus part of wider repertoire of toys 
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that would support the military endeavour of launch. At the same time however, 
the child collector might want to augment the Corporal with other model missiles 
produced by Corgi, such as the RAF’s ‘Bloodhound’ – a home-grown British 
surface-to-air missile in service throughout the Cold War.  The Corporal is thus 
not necessarily a stand alone object but rather it works as part of a collection, 
either of other ancillary equipment or of other comparable weapons. In this latter 
case, there is an echo of the strategic state-military practice of stockpiling: the act 
of creating assemblages of weapons to be seen and thus to be entered into the 
calculus of geopolitical negotiation. A parallel collection can be seen in the US 
National Biscuit Company (Nabisco) drive to circulate trading cards published in 
1959 in a series of 24 entitled ‘Defenders of America’, one of which featured the 
Corporal missile and another which featured the ‘FIRST FAMILY of the Nation’s 
big Missiles’ (Corporal, Honest John and Nike-Ajax). On the reverse side, it 
explained how ‘each of these cards is a full detailed reproduction of an official 
United States Army, Navy and Air Force or Marine photograph’. It went on to 
encourage the child-consumer to ‘get the entire set be eating Nabisco Shredded 
Wheat regularly and trading with your friends’. A Bowman trading card series 
called ‘Power for Peace’ also featured the Corporal under the title ‘the Corporal 
stands tough’, going on to detail how it could be ‘equipped with an atomic or 
conventional type warhead’. Brian Sutton-Smith talks about collections as 
‘mixtures of imagination and mastery’58. In this case they serve to make 
stockpiles of military hardware intelligible in, and transposable, to a domestic 
context.   
 
Most of these versions of the Corporal – in die cast miniature or on trading card 
– came already complete for use by the child. But in certain instances, the child 
was cast as rocket engineer and was entered into the labour of building the 
Corporal in the first place. A variety of mostly American toy manufacturers 
including Revell, Hawk and Monogram also produced Corporal missiles, pre-
assembled in a series of detachable moving plastic parts complete with 
appropriate stickers from which to build a precise scale model. In this case, the 
event of play was less concerned with launch or impact than with construction. 
 25
But this too is an act of participation in a much wider sphere. Ruth Oldenziel has 
shown how model construction in mid-twentieth century America was a serious 
means of developing the technical skill, stamina, patience and initiative of 
adolescent boys59. In one sense, to describe this as ‘play’ is to risk trivializing an 
important if informal apprenticeship in the development of space technology. But 
this is surely a further reminder about the extent to which play and work, toybox 
and silo, are co-constitutive. It is through such unremarkable means that the 




BRINGING THE HISTORY OF ROCKETRY DOWN TO EARTH 
 
 
Aside from notable advances in molecular biology, the 1950s saw two 
unprecedented scientific investigations into the fabric of Earth and Outer Earth 
alike. The development of space technologies like the BUMPER WAC Corporal 
and subsequent sounding rockets provided a much more detailed picture of 
Earth’s atmosphere, as well as producing iconic images of the Earth from space. 
At the same time, however, exploration turned in on itself – an involution – to 
examine sub-atomic ‘spaces’ which, through nuclear testing, produced its own 
peculiar geographies, in laboratory and field and across subterranean and 
terrestrial realms60. These developments are linked by a common military and 
geopolitical rationale that aimed to cultivate weapons of mass destruction and the 
means by which they could be urgently delivered to the other side of the globe.  In 
this way, both the Space Age and the Atomic Age are folded into the geopolitical 
strategies of the Cold War, the ascent into space being, in one sense, merely 
charismatic evidence of a more sinister capability. And yet the inseparable 
character of the nuclearism and rocketry is sometimes obsessively denied by the 
champions of space. ‘Space flight, fortunately, will be different’ wrote Heinz 
Haber in 1956, as it ‘begins under the auspices of a noble international effort to 
be carried out in a spirit of peaceful cooperation’. But the ultimate extent of 
international co-operation manifest in the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty 
conception of space as res communis (‘a thing for all’) rather than res nullius (‘a 
thing for no-one’), was always more of a Cold War fudge designed to check the 
territorial and astropolitical ambitions of the superpower adversary. Despite the 
ongoing presence of the International Space Station (at $100 billion, the most 
expensive piece of technology ever built), space exploration has proved to be little 
different from the technologies of the atom: it remains a matter of competition 
rather than cooperation, and of weaponisation as much as civilian 
infrastructure61. And the current push towards dual use (civilian and military) 
space hardware62 is itself indicative of the abiding indistinction between vehicle 
and weapon that was apparent fifty years ago with the launch of the Corporal. 
The story of the Corporal can thus be seen as an early intimation of the fact that 
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space exploration would primarily be a matter of projecting terrestrial 
geopolitical power. The aim of this essay, at least in part, has been to bring the 
history of rocketry down to Earth. 
 
Seen in the light of terrestrial geopolitics, the imperial context of Cold War 
rocketry, and the wider endeavour of space exploration, becomes ever more 
apparent. In the annals of exploration, this is plainly not a new story: earlier 
precedents of exploring the sea and polar ice would likely offer some interesting 
parallels with the account I have described here63. So it is worth emphasising that 
the exploration and colonization of space does not represent a radical departure 
from the past but should be considered as an extension of longstanding regimes 
of power. As Peter Redfield succinctly observed, to move into space is ‘a form of 
return’: it represents ‘a passage forward through the very pasts we might think we 
are leaving behind’64. Some recent work on the historical geographies of extra-
terrestrial spaces, for instance, has persuasively shown how longstanding 
geographical practices of naming, mapping and topographical description were 
instrumental in the construction of planetary bodies such as Mars65. All of this 
supports the idea that space has long been part and parcel of Earth’s 
geography66; and that this Earthly-celestial tradition should itself be an 
inducement for geographers to think more closely about ‘the space of space’ in its 
many cultural, historical  and (geo)political expressions.  
 
In this essay, I have unapologetically concentrated on the popular place of 
rocketry within the Cold War, rather than any technical or strategic account. I 
have done so because it seems to me that this is where the rocket/missile derives 
much of its geopolitical power. The version of the popular in operation here is of 
course quite different from much of the work on popular culture. Rather than 
reproduce the well-worn critique of, say, Hollywood film, I have chosen to focus 
on more mundane activities such as play and on such seemingly unlikely 
geopolitical agents as children. It is through these means, I have argued, that 
space exploration and the Cold War are enacted and made meaningful in 
domestic contexts. That is to say, through the ordinary rehearsal of defending ‘us’ 
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(Western, free, capitalist) from ‘them’, using technologies that also offer a 
transcendent future, the child-consumer-player is inducted into a wider 
geopolitical frame. Not only do toys and play have extraordinary propagandist 
value, but more importantly, they also bring about an informal apprenticeship in 
domains that slip very readily into ‘real world’ technics and activities. Moreover, 
the play of rocketry naturalises the anxieties of the Cold War and arguably helps 
make sense of otherwise difficult concepts of leaving home and nuclear 
destruction. Most importantly of all, such toys bestow in their child operative a  
proprietary sense of the future: that the realm of space and the technical 
development of its exploration is something that belongs to them in their 
impending adult lives. 
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